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Abstract
With the adoption of mobile healthcare applications and the success of cloud service models, we propose a privacy management
framework for mobile health care applications with support for dynamic privacy management of health data sharing. Our solution
extends the XACML policy language by incorporating user access context into the privacy policy rule enforcement. We provide
an implementation of our approach that builds on top of the Google App Engine cloud platform. We also provide a preliminary
evaluation that indicates that the overhead incurred by our approach is minimal.
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1. Introduction
With the emergence of the Participatory Sensing paradigm1, and the widespread use of mobile phones, users
can now share their data, e.g., health data. The success of cloud service models increased the adoption of mobile
healthcare applications2,3, which instantly record and analyze patients data. Mobile applications collect data from
ubiquitous devices and combine it with other data about users for diﬀerent purposes. Atomically, these data sources
may not reveal personally identiﬁable information for individuals, but linking a number of distributed sources may
lead to unintended consequences and breach of privacy. A malicious request, for instance, can beneﬁt from combining
atomic data items even if it claims a purpose that complies with a patient’s privacy preference for each of the atomic
items. Thus, the patient’s consent and his privacy policy at the time of data collection may not be enough for data
disclosure. According to governmental reports, around eight million records of patient’s health data was leaked in
the past few years4. Therefore, in order to encourage users to share their data we need to provide them with privacy-
enabled infrastructures.
One challenge that cloud service environments pose is context-sensitivity. Privacy policy deﬁnitions are often
statically chosen by data owners at the time of data collection, where patients are asked to make privacy decisions
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regarding their sensitive information. Therefore, we need a mechanism to dynamically identify context of data usage
and make a decision regarding data disclosure, not only based on the current context, but also based on previous
contexts. Dynamicity is in turn needed, not only at the decision level but also at the privacy policy rule level. To make
this information machine processable, i.e., with added semantics, another challenge is then to deﬁne privacy policy
rules in terms of concepts and relations that are widely accepted (e.g., using some domain ontology).
Context has been deﬁned in the literature in terms of trust, aﬃliation, query history, temporal or spatial relation-
ships5. Some of these solutions base access control decisions on static information, such as particular users or roles,
and are therefore pre-determined. Recently, few researchers proposed solutions to dynamically handle context. How-
ever, the dynamicity of these solutions is only at the decision level, not at the rule level. Similarly, the few approaches
that have dealt with this problem still predetermine the rule and the context types, based on a set of activities, states,
and contexts in which the user could be. Moreover, these rules are not deﬁned in semantic terms and do not govern
what is potentially sensitive data. We present an approach for dynamic context handling that updates the policy rules at
the time of data access, based on the context. Therefore, our approach relies not only on pre-deﬁned user preferences
regarding data disclosure, but also on the context in which the requester asks for the data. Our solution to dynamic
context handling is motivated by the success of existing learning and inference techniques that have been extensively
applied in the context of the Web. Speciﬁcally, we focus on probability and information entropy theory to deﬁne our
privacy management model.
The success of XACML as an access control language resulted in wide adoption. According to a naiive XACML-
based privacy policy management model, the organization hosting the Web service should deﬁne a Policy Adminis-
tration Point (PAP), through which policies can be deﬁned and deployed to a Policy Decision Point (PDP). A Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) located either on the user agent side, the Web service side, or on a gateway between the
user and the service, forms a request and sends it to the PDP. In XACML, a request consists of attributes including the
subject, the object, the action and the environment. The PEP requests a decision from the PDP through the Context
Handler, which collects initial attributes from Policy Information Points (PIPs). The PDP uses attributes obtained by
the context handler to evaluate policies. The PDP can further request additional attributes from the context handler as
needed. The PDP returns a Permit or Deny decision to the PEP, which ﬁnally enforces the ﬁnal decision.
This paper contributes a privacy framework for mobile health care applications with support for dynamic privacy
management of health data sharing. Our solution extends the XACML policy language by incorporating user access
context into the privacy policy rule enforcement. We provide an implementation of our approach that builds on top of
the Google App Engine cloud platform. The paper is organized as follows: First, we motivate the problem through
a scenario in Section 2. This is followed by the proposed solution in Section 3. We then present the framework
implementation and evaluation (Section 4). Finally, we discuss some related works and future directions (Section 5).
2. Motivation
Several mobile applications rely on users to share data, which is later generated by mobile devices. Assume that
a patient has been diagnosed by a hospital and decided to use a wearable device to monitor his status. The patients
data gets collected instantly to alert his physicians of emergency cases. The patient also participates in a research
study where he shares his data with a research institute. Another entity that might have the patient’s data is his
insurance company, which might also interact with his hospital. Each of these entities has a portion of the data and
each requests the data for a diﬀerent purpose. For data sharing purposes, assume that each entity manages data access
and usage through a cloud service WS i. Through WS i interface, a requester S j can perform a set of operations (e.g.,
checkPatientStatus()). Each operation Opj exposed by WS i queries an ontology-based repository and returns a
set of data type properties Dj.
Assume also that all the set of data type properties that a requester can search for are stored as concepts in a generic
ontology, which has a taxonomy for purposes P (e.g., P = {Research,Diagnosis,Marketing}) and another for data
type properties D (e.g., D = {hasPatientS tatus, hasBloodPressure, hasDischargedDate, hasLocation, treatedByTeam}).
To manage the privacy of the patient’s data, the cloud service WS i deﬁnes a privacy policy for each patient instance I j
in it’s repository. Together with every instance, WS i records the patient’s predeﬁned disclosure preferences over his
data type properties and the purpose of disclosure Pj. Listing 1 shows an example of an instance for a patient who
has chosen to expose his status for research purposes. Listing 2 shows the ALFA code for a policy that governs the
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usage of the instance in Listing 1. We use the Axiomatics ALFA authorization language6 syntax for XACML policy
representation.
Listing 1. An ontology instance of a patient from our scenario with no context detected
<rdf:RDF
xmlns:mc="http://www.michcare.com/michcare.owl#">
<mc:Patient rdf:about="patient1">
<mc:hasPatientStatus>Bad</mc:hasPatientStatus>
<mc:hasPatientPreference>yes</mc:hasPatientPreference>
<mc:canReleaseStatus>yes</mc:canReleaseStatus>
<mc:hasPurpose>Research</mc:hasPurpose>
<mc:hasContext>None detected</mc:hasContext>
</rdf>
Listing 2. A privacy policy that governs the usage of an instance written in ALFA
namespace obligations{
obligation QRObligation = "edu:wayne:obligation:ch"}
namespace MobiDycWS_policies {
policy patient1Policy {
apply firstApplicable
rule PatientStatusAccessRule{
target clause Attributes.resourceId=="hasPatientStatus" and actionId=="view"
condition subjectPurpose==purpose
permit
on permit{
obligation obligations.QRObligation{
Attributes.resourceId = Attributes.resourceId
}}}}}
Adversary Model. Assume that an adversary submits several requests to a number of Web services, and claims a
diﬀerent purpose in each request. It is not hard for the adversary to ask for the same data type properties in more
than one request, and link them to other sensitive data type properties available from other public data sets (e.g. Age
and Gender). Furthermore, the adversary may perform his requests in separate phases. In an initial phase, he submits
initial exploratory queries that do not explicitly ask for sensitive data. The purpose of those queries is to get an overall
view of the data. For example, an adversary can ﬁrst ask for patientS tatus of all patients that are within some Age
range for Research purposes. In later phases, he may look for patients who have been diagnosed for a certain disease
for Diagnosis purpose. To this eﬀect, he changes the purpose of the query. Therefore, in each phase some query
attributes are expected to change abnormally. Due to these reasons, we wish to preserve privacy whenever values of
data type properties retrieved from diﬀerent Web services are combined in a way that violates privacy policy rules tied
to those data type properties. To this end, we make WS i context-sensitive. Next, we present our solution by deﬁning
our notion of context and how we incorporate it into dynamic privacy management.
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Fig. 1. Dynamic privacy policy management solution.
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3. Dynamic Privacy Management
In this section, we explain our approach including the system architecture and the formal model deﬁnition.
Architecture We build a semantic privacy policy management framework on the top of the Google App Engine
reference architecture for Mobile App development and the XACML reference architectures for policy-based access
control. Fig. 1 illustrates the main components of our system. The data generated by the users is eventually stored
and managed by the GAE data store. The data store also stores the users data and associated access policies, and the
later are deployed in the PDP. A requester S j using our system uses his mobile device to query data. The application
forwards the request to the PEP component, which forwards the request to the PDP, which retrieves the policies from
the data store and evaluates them. In case of a Permit decision, a set of obligations is sent to the PEP for further
check. The PEP then communicates with the Semantic Handler (SH), which interprets the request as a SPARQL
query Qj and looks up attributes in the service’s ontology-based repository and passes the set of instances I that
match the query together with the query Qj to the Context Handler (CH). The Context Handler consists of two sub
components. The Classiﬁer, which dynamically classiﬁes a query as being potentially malicious or legitimate, and
the Sensitive Data Detector, which dynamically determines the subset of data type properties in a query that could
potentially be sensitive. WS i uses the context CTXT inferred by it’s sub components to update the context of each
instance in I. The PEP uses CTXT to make the ﬁnal decision by performing Dynamic Rule Check (DRC) and Query
Rewriting (QR), which will be explained in Section 3. The PEP then notiﬁes the PDP, which looks up the updated
rule context and sends the response back to the PEP. Next, we explain how the context is inferred.
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Fig. 2. Dynamic Context Handling.
Dynamic Context Handling We brieﬂy explain our dynamic context handling process (Fig. 2) and we refer the keen
reader to our previous work for more details7. Our context handling algorithm (Algorithm 1) retrieves the set of all
previous queries QS from a query log. It also receives the query Qj that pertains to a request Rj as a vector that
consists of the purpose Pj and the data type properties in Dj.
The algorithm then passes QS to a Naive Bayes-based QueryClassiﬁcation algorithm. For each query Qi the algo-
rithm is given the purpose Pi and the set of data type properties Di. To predict the class labelC j+1 for a newly submitted
query Qi+1 with purpose Pi+1 and set of data type properties Di+1, the algorithm computes Pr(Pi+1,Di+1|C j)Pr(C j),
for j = {malicious, legitimate} based on the estimated parameters from the training data. The algorithm returns a
query classiﬁcation Cj.
The algorithm then determines, for a set of queries, the set of data type properties DB that could potentially be
sensitive even given the previously inferred context. The algorithm calls two sub-routines; the RelativeSensitivity
algorithm and the Data diversity algorithm. In the RelativeSensitivity algorithm we apply conditional entropy to
measure the relative sensitivity of a set of data type properties Di that is asked for in a newly submitted query with
respect to two things. First, the relative sensitivity of Di with respect to the set of predetermined sensitive data type
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Algorithm 1 Dynamic Context Handling Algorithm
1. Input: QS ,Qj
2. Output: CTXT
3. C j ← QueryClassification(QS ,Qj)
4. DB ← RelativeSensitivity(QS ,Qj, t,DA)
5. if i mod M equals 0 then
6. trigger ← DiversityChangeDetection(QS , t,M)
7. end if
8. CTXT ← C j ∪ DB ∪ trigger UpdateInstanceContext(I,CTXT )
9. Q′j ← DynamicRuleCheck(Qj, I)
properties DA, which users often indicate at the time of data collection (e.g., Name). Second, the relative sensitivity of
Di with respect to all sets of data type properties D1, ...,Dk in the set previously submitted queries QS . In both cases,
the algorithm uses the information gain as a measure of the mutual information between two random variables.The
algorithm ﬁrst computes the information gain between the sets Di and DA. It then computes the information gain
between Di and each set of data type properties D1, ...,Dk in the set of previously submitted queries QS . If either
case results in an information gain that is higher than a threshold t, the algorithm distills the data type properties in Di
that caused the highest information gain. The resulting data type properties are then added to the subset of relatively
sensitive data DB.
The DiversityChangeDetection algorithm takes the query space QS , the threshold t, and the number of queries
M to consider in each phase as inputs. The algorithm ﬁrst calculates the entropy of QS based on three criteria. The
purpose regardless of the data (P), the data given a purpose (D|P), and both attributes combined (PD). It then creates a
map of entropy values for each phase. It then uses the resulting phase diversity map to monitor the change in diversity
between phases by comparing the change to a threshold t. The algorithm returns a boolean trigger indicating whether
there is an attempt to breach sensitive data in the recently submitted query.
The UpdateInstanceContext algorithm then updates the context block of each instance in the set of matching
instances I (Fig. 2). The context is a combination of the classiﬁcation C j, the set DB, and the diversity trigger. In
addition to the context information, the query id Qj, the set Dj, and the purpose Pj are stored. Listing 3 demonstrates
an instance with updated context.
Listing 3. A portion of an updated context of the instance in Listing 1 with updated context
<mc:hasContext>
<mc:hasQj>1</mc:hasQj>
<mc:hasPj>Research</mc:hasPj>
<mc:hasDj>hasPatientStatus,hasDischargeDate,hasLocation</mc:hasDj>
<mc:hasDB>hasLocation, hasPatientStatus</mc:hasDB>
<mc:hasCj>malicious<mc:hasCj>
<mc:hasContext>
If a query Qj matches an instance, the policy rules that govern the usage of the data type properties in Dj of that
instance iterate the context block of that instance to also incorporate the new context values into policy evaluation.
For example, if a query asks for the PatientS tatus data type property, and there is an instance that has a policy that
in turn has a rule which has in it’s conditions block a condition that governs the usage of the PatientS tatus data type
property (e.g., Listing 2), the context of that instance is updated. If a query matches an instance, the PDP ﬁrst checks
the policy rules that govern each of the data type properties in Di of that instance to see if the purpose Pi of the query
matches the purpose indicated in each rule. If any of the data type properties in Di does not match any of the rule
conditions, a “deny” response is returned and the corresponding data type property will not be disclosed. However, if
a “permit” response is returned, the PEP further checks for contradictions between the permissions that a rule states
regarding a data type property and previously stored contexts. For an instance I that matches the query the PEP checks
if any of the data type properties di of Di is included in a previously detected relatively sensitive data set DB. If a
match is found, our PEP rejects the disclosure of di. For example, the rule in Listing 2 permits the disclosure of
the PatientS tatus property. However, a previously inferred context (Listing 3) indicates that PatientS tatus has been
marked to be potentially sensitive as indicated in the DB part. Thus, the PEP denies access to PatientS tatus.
The DynamicRuleCheck algorithm then takes the set I and the query Qj as inputs and, for each instance Ik in I,
checks each policy rule Rk that govern each of the data type properties in Dj to see if the purpose Pj of the query
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matches the purpose indicated in Rk. In the case of a purpose mismatch, the data type property dk is excluded from Dj.
However, if a rule permits the disclosure of a data type property dk, further check is performed to investigate if there
are contradictions between the permissions that a rule states regarding dk and the set of previously stored contexts
CTXT of the matching instances. First, if the query is classiﬁed as malicious, feature selection is used to ﬁlter out
the subset of data type properties D′j in the query that resulted in such a classiﬁcation. Second, a check is made to
see if any of the data type properties dk of Di is included in a previously detected relatively sensitive data set DB.
Finally, the diversity trigger is checked to determine if there has been irregularity in the query sets due to the newly
submitted query. If any data type property dk requested in the query is either sensitive, relatively sensitive, resulted in
a malicious classiﬁcation, or caused irregularity in the query set, the query Qj is rewritten to exclude dk and the new
query Q′j is run by the repository.
4. Evaluation
In this section, we present the implementation of the framework and a preliminary evaluation of the approach.
Implementation We programmed all projects in Java using Eclipse 3.4 and instrumented it with the Google plugin
for Eclipse and the Android Development Tools. We detail the main parts of our project below:
• Context Handler: we implemented the classiﬁer component using the Weka API8 and the query diversity and
relative sensitivity components using the JavaMI API9. For relative sensitivity, we used the Chi-Squared test to
measure the signiﬁcance of the mutual information between two sets of data type properties with an alpha level
of 0.05. For query diversity, we chose an M value of 5.
• PEP Agent We implemented a PEP agent client using the SunXACML engine10, and we incorporated our con-
text handler implementation into the PEP implementation. In XACML, a policy rule does not control data
retrieval. For policy enforcement, we used XACML obligations at the PEP level to ensure only desirable data
type attributes are returned to the user. We deﬁne our own obligation for query rewriting (QRObligation)
by extending the Obligation class. We execute an instance of QRObligation at the PEP in case of per-
mit decisions by calling the evaluate() method. The method reads the rewritten query Q′j returned by the
QueryRewriting algorithm and returns the subset D′j of the requested set Dj to the user.
• MobiDyc is the Android client through which the user can query data. The application allows users to retrieve
health data stored in the cloud through an Android mobile device or emulator. The client communicates with
the App Engine in the background to gather stored information requested by the user. We created an object-
relational mapping interface which interacts with the backend data repository to enable users to query data using
their mobile devices. Each user query gets inserted to the backend data store.
• The MobiDyc-AppEngine is the backend project through which we provide the service in the cloud. We imple-
mented a service that exposes patients data as operations and we deployed our services as backends to the GAE
repository.
Data sets For instance sets, we created RDF ﬁles using concepts from a Home Patient Monitoring System (HPMS)
available from the E-HIP11 project. We used a realistic policy set from E-HIP, which consists of 19 atomic policies.
The policies require 30 attributes in total. We chose 16 of those attributes to represent the resource attributes (the data
type properties in our case). Of the 30 attributes, 8 are considered sensitive, so we chose those as our initial set of
sensitive data type properties DA. We generated synthetic request sets to simulate practical cases in which one data
type property appears repeatedly in diﬀerent requests. To generate a set of requests we used a core request template.
Test Plans. We conﬁgured the Java Metrics performance testing framework to simulate diﬀerent number of user-
s/threads (Table 1). We compared the average evaluation time of our implementation of PEP (SunXACML+CH) to
the standard PEP implementation provided by SunXACML.
Results. The results of comparing the average evaluation time of our implementation of PEP (SunXACML+CH)
to the standard PEP implementation provided by SunXACML (Fig. 3) indicate that the overhead introduced by the
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Table 1. Setup for Java metrics library test plan.
Environment 2GHz Intel Dual-Core i7 Mac, 8GB RAM, 64bit OS X 10.8.
Threads (Users) 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32
Warm-up runs 10
Iterations 100
Policies 19 policies
Data type properties/ request 3, 6, 11
context handler is not signiﬁcant. The ﬁgure also illustrates the evaluation times in terms of the number of data type
properties.
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Fig. 3. Average evaluation time of SunXACML (lower bar) compared to our implementation (upper bar) for diﬀerent number of data type properties
and threads.
Our results also indicate that on average, the percentage of the decisions that came as permit using a standard
SunXACML PEP implementation is always higher than that of PEP with our context handler incorporated. For 10
requests, the results indicate that 80% of the requests were permitted in the case of standard SunXACML while it
was 60% in the case of our implementation. When we increased the number of requests to 50, 66% of the requests
were permitted in the case of standard SunXACML and only 20% in our case. Finally, increasing the requests to 100
caused 63% of the requests to be permitted in the case of standard SunXACML and only 26% in our case. These
observations justify the cost of context inference with the trade-oﬀ that the accuracy is better in our case.
5. Related Work
We brieﬂy present some of the proposed approaches for privacy policy management.
Context-based Privacy Policy Management. Most context-aware systems do not consider the dynamicity at the
rule level in decision making12,13,14,15. Some of these approaches dynamically handle a user request by applying
techniques that regulate rather than prevent the data access such as HDB14,15. The dynamic trust adjustment model
proposed in12 also dynamically handles context, but they focus on access control, in terms of who has access to the
information as opposed to what is being collected. Also, their approach relies on inferring context using sensed spatial
and temporal information and they do not achieve dynamicity at rule level. Among the relatively few researchers
who took dynamicity of a context to a higher level by considering dynamicity of a rule is Pallapa et al. 16. They
proposed a context aware scheme for privacy preservation by maintaining a model of the user’s environment, which
is characterized by user’s activities and situations. Their solution accounts for ﬁne grained rules and they apply
a dynamic rule generator. However, both the rule and the context types are still predetermined based on a set of
activities, states, and contexts in which the user could be. Also, these rules are not deﬁned in semantic terms and do
not govern what is potentially sensitive data.
Privacy Policy Enforcement. Several technologies have been applied to achieve privacy policy enforcement by
considering the requester’s permission and the owner’s consent17,14,15. Similar to our approach, those approaches
do not rely on a third party for enforcement purposes. Grandison14 and Agrawal15 have both leveraged the Active
Enforcement module of the Hippocratic Database technology (HDB) by transforming an original query to another
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query that is policy-compliant. They also track the purpose of a query to determine if a query is suspicious or not, but
they detect that only after the fact.
XACML-based Privacy for Mobile Applications. We are not the ﬁrst to provide privacy-aware solutions for mobile
applications. Anh et al. 18 implemented a middleware for building privacy-aware mobile applications. They built their
solution on top of GAE and they used XACML obligations to deﬁne several functions to determine to what extent
users can share their data with their friends in social networking environments based on similarity or ﬁltering. De
Cristofaro et al. 19 proposed a privacy-aware infrastructure for building participatory sensing applications to protect
the data of both the data user and the provider. Their solution relies on a tagging mechanism that builds on the top
of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE). Similar to these approaches, our approach deﬁnes ﬁne-grained privacy policies
rules at the level of each data item. Our approach further provides dynamicity at the rule rather than the decision level.
also, our approach deﬁnes rules using semantic concepts and deﬁnes preferences partially at the instance level.
6. Conclusion
We have previously proposed and implemented an approach for dynamic context handling. In this paper, we
presented an implementation of a framework for health data sharing via Mobile applications on the top of a standard
XACML framework and GAE. We have also presented a preliminary evaluation of our approach, which indicates that
the overhead incurred by our approach is minimal. Our future work includes implementing mobile applications using
our privacy framework and evaluating the approach on real world applications.
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